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JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a final order entered on January 23, 2001, by Judge
Gary D. Stott of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of
Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of Defendant Lars

Lynge ("Lynge") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when Lynge did not
conduct substantial and continuous local activity in Utah, when Lynge otherwise did not
engage in any activities within Utah out of which Plaintiffs' claims arose or that caused
injury in Utah, and when Lynge was not a party to any contract containing a forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of Defendant Gorm

International Corporation ("Gorm") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when
Gorm did not conduct substantial and continuous local activity in Utah, when Gorm did
not engage in any activities within Utah out of which Plaintiffs' claims arose or that
caused injury in Utah, and when Gorm entered into a contract - to which Plaintiffs
were not a party - that contained a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause under
which Gorm agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah for resolution of
any conflict or litigation arising under the contract.
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Standard of Review:
The Court reviews for correctness a trial court's decision to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction based upon the memoranda of points and authorities and affidavits
submitted by the parties. Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, \ 2, 8 P.3d
256; see Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah
1992).
STATUTES AND CONTRACT PROVISIONS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998):
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state as to any claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this
state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real
estate situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or
risk located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of
the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the
defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78,
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Chapter 45 a, to determine paternity for the purpose of
establishing responsibility for child support.
2.

Section 1 of Distributor Agreement between Defendant Gorm International
Corp. and Nu Skin International:
DEFINITIONS
* * *

Contract: The Agreement between a Distributor and Nu Skin Enterprises is
composed of these Policies and Procedures, the Sales Compensation Plan,
Distributor Agreement, Partnership/Corporation From and supplemental Sponsor
Agreements. The Contract is the complete and only Agreement between Nu
Skin Enterprises and a Distributor.
3.

Section 27 of Distributor Agreement between Defendant Gorm International
Corp. and Nu Skin International:
GOVERNING LAW
The place of origin of this Contract, the place where the Company accepted the
offer of a prospective Distributor to form the Contract, is the State of Utah.
This Contract is to be construed with respect to its validity and performance
obligations thereunder, in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah
applicable to contracts made and to be wholly performed within such State. A
Distributor agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah
for resolution of any conflict or litigation arising under or purporting to interpret
the Contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case And Course Of The Proceedings
This case involves an action brought in Utah by residents of Texas against

residents of Colorado.
Plaintiffs, as distributors for Nu Skin International Corp. ("Nu Skin"), bring
three separate claims for breach of contract against the three Defendants who had
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entered into separate distributor agreements with Nu Skin - Clifton Associates, Inc.,
Gorm International Corporation, and Dennis Clifton. The first claim is that these three
Defendants breached their respective distributor agreements with Nu Skin "by
encouraging, enticing and otherwise assisting another Distributor to transfer to a
different sponsor." (ffl 85-92 of First Amended Complaint; R. 221-22.) The second
claim is identical, except that Plaintiffs additionally allege that they are third-party
beneficiaries of these three Defendants' respective agreements with Nu Skin, (f f 93101 of First Amended Complaint; R. 220-21.) The third contract claim is that these
three Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in their
respective agreements with Nu Skin,

(ff 109-13 of First Amended Complaint; R.

219.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert a tort claim against all of the Defendants for
wrongful interference with contractual relations, and a claim for unjust enrichment
alleging that all of the Defendants wrongfully interfered with and usurped an economic
benefit provided to Plaintiffs under their own distributor agreement with Nu Skin, (^f
102-108 and 114-20 of First Amended Complaint; R. 219-20.)
Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on March 29, 2000. In that complaint, Nu
Skin was named as a defendant but was voluntarily dismissed from the case by
Plaintiffs on the basis of an arbitration agreement in Plaintiffs' distributor agreement
with Nu Skin.

(R. 82-83.)

The dismissal was effected even before Defendants'
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respective counsel made their appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
In May 2000, Lynge and Gorm, through separate counsel, each filed motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Add. Ex.'s 2 through 6), as did defendants
Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. (the "Clifton Defendants"),
through their own counsel. The motions were supported by affidavits of the respective
Defendants, evidencing their lack of activities in Utah.
On July 18, 2000, oral argument on the motions was conducted by Judge Ray
M. Harding, Jr. Judge Harding took the motions under advisement, requesting that Nu
Skin submit an affidavit indicating what it believed to be the intent, if any, of the forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause contained in Nu Skin's distributor agreement
with respect to claims solely between distributors who have not contracted with each
other, as opposed to claims between the actual parties to the agreement, i.e., between
Nu Skin and the contracting distributor. (R. 214.)
In a letter to Judge Harding dated July 19, 2000 - the day after the hearing
conducted by Judge Harding on the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
- Plaintiffs, through their counsel, informed the trial court that they did not want to
have the court consider the validity of the arbitration clause contained in the parties'
respective distributor agreements with Nu Skin. Plaintiff also acknowledged in that
letter that Lynge and defendant David Clifton, as individuals, were not Nu Skin
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distributors and, on that basis alone, were not subject to any arbitration clause upon
which Plaintiffs could base a demand for mandatory arbitration. (R. 215-16.)
Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, dated July 26, 2000, restating
various claims against Defendants and asserting an alternative demand for mandatory
arbitration between the parties based on the parties' respective distributor agreements
with Nu Skin. (R. 217-231.)
On August 1, 2000, after filing the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs entered
into a stipulation filed with the trial court. (R. 235-39.) In the stipulation, Plaintiffs
acknowledged that they withdrew their request that the court consider the issues of
arbitration at that time. (R. 237.) The issues for the trial court, then, were deemed by
the parties to center on whether by executing a distributor agreement with Nu Skin
containing a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the Defendant distributors
consented to personal jurisdiction in Utah in a civil action brought by other distributors,
and not by Nu Skin - the other party to the contract containing the forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. (Id.)
On August 29, 2000, Judge Harding recused himself, and the case was
reassigned to Judge Gary Stott. (R. 247.)
On November 29, 2000, Judge Stott conducted a second hearing on the pending
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

(Hearing Transcript, R. 280.)

Judge Stott granted the motions and entered an Order approved by counsel for all of the
parties and signed by the court on January 23, 2001. (R. 257-60, Add. Ex. 1.) The
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court granted the motions based on the supporting memoranda of the respective
Defendants, which were accompanied by affidavits of the Defendants. (R. 258.)
B.

Statement Of Facts
1.

Lynge is an individual residing in the state of Colorado.

Lars Lynge at t 3; R. 166.) Gorm is a Colorado corporation.

(Affidavit of

(Affidavit of Guy

Humphries at 1 4; R. 132.)
2.

Neither Lynge nor Gorm transacts any business within the state of Utah.

(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 4; R. 166; Affidavit of Guy Humphries at 1 5; R. 132.)
3.

Neither Lynge nor Gorm has caused any injury within the state of Utah,

whether tortious or by breach of warranty. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 5; R. 166.)
4.

Gorm executed a corporate distributorship agreement with Nu Skin on or

about March 20, 1996. Until December 1, 1996, Lynge was a "Principal Partner" in
and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of Gorm's corporate distributor
agreement with Nu Skin. As of December 1, 1996, Lynge voluntarily terminated his
role in the Gorm distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not going
to commence operations in his native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future.
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 6; R. 166.)
5.

The tortious conduct that Plaintiffs alleged Lynge engaged in took place

between February 1997 and September 1997, when Lynge was not involved in Gorm.
(Amended Complaint at f1f 42-55; R. 225-26.)
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6.

Lynge's only contacts with the state of Utah have been in his capacity as

an officer or employee of Gorm. Those contacts have consisted only of attending two
Nu Skin company-wide conventions in Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu
Skin officials their plans for opening countries in Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at
f 9 ; R . 165.)
7.

Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had a place of business in Utah. They have

not recruited prospective distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do
business in Utah, have not placed advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings
into Utah, have not maintained a web site accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold
product into Utah, have not generated any business volume from Utah, and have not
conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings in Utah. Neither has had
any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah. Lynge was recruited to
participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his activities relating to Nu
Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and office in Colorado and in
Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at if 9; R. 165.)
8.

All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege Lynge and Gorm

engaged took place outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury
complained of from that alleged conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the
two Plaintiffs reside. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at % 10; R. 165.)
9.

All of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against

Gorm for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities
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alleged by Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or
businesses within the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 12; R. 164.)
10.

Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had any contractual relationship with either

Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 11; R. 164.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in ruling that the court did not have personal
jurisdiction over defendants Lynge and Gorm. They were not conducting substantial
and continuous local activity in the forum state, nor did Plaintiffs' claims arise out of
the particular activities of Lynge and Gorm in the forum state. Finally, in this instance,
the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in Gorm's contract with Nu Skin does
not establish specific personal jurisdiction over either Lynge or Gorm.
Utah courts clearly do not have general jurisdiction over Lynge and Gorm.
Neither defendant has conducted substantial and continuous local activity in the forum
state. While Gorm is a party to a contract containing a forum selection/consent-tojurisdiction clause, the existence of such a clause does not create contacts with the
forum state sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. Moreover, Lynge is not even a
party to the contract containing the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
Finally, from a review of the Brief of Appellants, it does not appear as though Plaintiffs
even contend that Lynge and Gorm are subject to general personal jurisdiction in this
state. Indeed, Plaintiffs' analysis deals only with whether Lynge and Gorm are subject
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to specific personal jurisdiction, based on the existence of Gorm's contract with Nu
Skin.
Similarly, Lynge is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this state. He
did not purposefully direct any activities at any residents of the forum state, and, even
if there were such activities - which there were not - the claims asserted in this
litigation do not arise out of or relate to any such activities. Moreover, any contacts of
Lynge were in his capacity as a principal of the corporation. The exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Lynge, therefore, would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and
constitutional due process requirements.
Except for the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in its contract with
Nu Skin, Gorm, like Lynge, did not purposefully direct any activities at any residents
of the forum state, and, even if there were such activities - which there were not - the
claims asserted in this litigation do not arise out of or relate to any such activities.
The forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause does not give rise to specific
jurisdiction because Gorm's contract was with Nu Skin - not Plaintiffs. Gorm did not
consent to litigate claims in Utah with strangers to the contract such as Plaintiffs. The
plain reading of the adhesion contract supports such a conclusion, and the very
definition of the "contract" clearly states that the contract is between Nu Skin and a
distributor - not a contract with the thousands upon thousands of Nu Skin distributors
located and operating throughout the world.

Moreover, in this case, the requisite

rational nexus between Utah and either the parties or the transactions that are the
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subject matter of the contract does not exist. As with Lynge, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Gorm would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and constitutional
due process requirements.
ARGUMENT
A.

General Principles Of Utah Law Governing The Exercise Of Personal
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants,
Utah courts recognize two types of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents:

general and specific. The Court has recently reiterated the differences between the two
theories:
Generally, '[pjersonal jurisdiction can be broken down into two
categories. Either a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant or it
has specific jurisdiction. General personal jurisdiction permits a court to
exercise power over a defendant without regard to the subject of the claim
asserted. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting
substantial and continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast,
specific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only
with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the
defendant in the forum state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant
must have certain minimum local contacts.'
Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, \ 11, 8 P.3d 256, quoting Arguello v.
Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) (emphasis in
original).
In this case, as discussed below, neither Lynge nor Gorm is subject to
either general or specific personal jurisdiction.
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B.

Lynge's And Gorm's Contacts With Utah Are Inadequate To Establish
General Jurisdiction,
Lynge's and Gorm's contacts with Utah are not sufficient to support a finding of

general jurisdiction. Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had a place of business in Utah.
They have not recruited prospective distributors residing in Utah, have not been
licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed advertisements in Utah, have not sent
direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a web site accessible to residents of
Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any business volume from
Utah, and have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings in
Utah. Neither has had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah.
Lynge was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his
activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and
office in Colorado and in Europe.
These contacts do not rise to the level of "substantial and continuous" required
under Utah law.

Indeed, these contacts with Utah are far less than those of the

defendant corporation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2nd 404 (1984). In that case, the United States
Supreme Court found that Texas did not have general jurisdiction over a Colombian
corporation. The Colombian company had sent its chief executive officer to Texas for
one contract negotiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, purchased
helicopters, equipment and training services from a Texas company and sent personnel
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to Texas for training. Noting that the defendant corporation did not have a place of
business in Texas and was not licensed to do business there, the court found that the
defendant's contacts with Texas could not be described or regarded as "continuous and
systematic" in nature. Id. at 416-17.
Additionally, these contacts are far less than those of other defendants over
whom courts have declined to exercise general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harnischfeger
Eng'rs v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F.Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995) (defendant's
sales in Utah amounted to one-tenth of 1% of the defendant's total business
nationwide). Neither Lynge nor Gorm has sold any product in Utah.
Indeed, Plaintiffs apparently do not contend in their brief that the trial court had
general jurisdiction over Lynge and Gorm. Their sole contention apparently is that the
defendants consented to jurisdiction in Utah through their respective distributor
agreements, thereby giving rise to specific jurisdiction over them. Lynge does not even
have a distributor agreement with Nu Skin. Moreover, Plaintiffs have acknowledged
that Lynge was not a Nu Skin distributor, and as such he was not subject to the terms of
the Nu Skin distributor agreement. (See R. 215-16, Letter from Edward W. McBride,
Jr., to Judge Raymond M. Harding, Jr., Add. Ex. 7.)
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C.

Lynge's And Gorm's Contacts With Utah Are Inadequate To Establish
Specific Jurisdiction.
To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction under Utah law, Lynge's and

Gorm's acts or contacts with Utah must satisfy the three-part inquiry set forth in
Harnischfeger.
(1)
the defendant's acts or contacts with Utah must implicate Utah
under the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a 'nexus' must exist between the
plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application
of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due
process.
Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64 at \ 12, quoting, Harnischfeger Eng'rs,
Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Utah 1995). Analysis of
this three-part inquiry demonstrates that Lynge and Gorm are not subject to specific
personal jurisdiction in Utah.
Acts implicating Utah under Utah's long-arm statute include:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance,
or child support, having resided, in the marital relationship,
within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from
the state; or the commission in this state of the act giving
rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission,
failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had
no control; or
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(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter
45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing
responsibility for child support.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998). None of these subsections is satisfied nor are the
requirements of the long-arm statute met.
The particular activities in Utah of Lynge and Gorm consisted only of Gorm recruited in Colorado - signing up in Colorado as a distributor of Nu Skin, a Utah
corporation, and Lynge's attendance at two company-wide conventions held in Utah in
1996 and 1998 and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries
in Europe.

Such activity is not sufficient to satisfy the Harnischfeger three-part

inquiry, including any of the subsections of the long-arm statute.
Indeed, none of the conduct complained of by Plaintiffs in this action even took
place in Utah or caused any injury in Utah.

Rather, the conduct complained of

allegedly took place in Colorado, where the Defendants reside and operated, and any
injury was felt in Texas, where the Plaintiffs reside.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims themselves did not arise out of Lynge's Utahrelated activities. "[S]pecific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant
only with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the
forum state." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122
(Utah 1992). Where the claims did not arise out of, or were not related to, Lynge's
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and Gorm's Utah-related activities, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over those
parties by the Utah courts is not appropriate.
Nor does the existence of a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in
Gorm's contract with Nu Skin give rise to specific jurisdiction over Gorm and Lynge.
That clause is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Gorm for two reasons:
First, Gorm did not enter into a contract with the Plaintiffs containing a forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Gorm's contract was with Nu Skin. Indeed,
Gorm's contract with Nu Skin expressly defines the contract as one between Nu Skin
and a distributor:
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
* * *

Contract: The Agreement between a Distributor and Nu Skin Enterprises is
composed of these Policies and Procedures, the Sales Compensation Plan,
Distributor Agreement, Partnership/Corporation From and supplemental Sponsor
Agreements. The Contract is the complete and only Agreement between Nu
Skin Enterprises and a Distributor.
By its plain language, the contract is not one between a particular distributor and all of
Nu Skin's other distributors - it is expressly a contract between Nu Skin and the
contracting distributor. Gorm, therefore, has consented only to jurisdiction in the Utah
courts for civil actions arising out of the contract between itself and Nu Skin - Gorm
did not consent to such jurisdiction for civil actions brought against it by other
distributors.
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Second, even if Gorm's contract with Nu is interpreted as consenting to
jurisdiction in civil actions brought not by Nu but by other distributors, the rational
nexus requirement of Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256, is not
met in this case. In Phone Directories v. Henderson, the Court instructed that forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clauses can confer personal jurisdiction so long as
"there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or consented to, and either
the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract."
2000 UT 64 at if 14.
Phone Directories v. Henderson involved a breach of contract claim between a
Utah-based company and a nonresident of Utah. In that case, the plaintiff was a Utahbased company with its principal place of business in Utah. The defendant telephoned
the plaintiffs CEO in Utah requesting employment, and telephoned and visited Utah to
negotiate his employment contract with the plaintiff.
In this case, while the plaintiff in Phone Directories v. Henderson was a Utahbased company, neither Plaintiffs nor Gorm are residents of or have any particular
connection with the forum state, except minimally as one of thousands upon thousands
of Nu Skin distributors operating throughout the world. While the defendant in Phone
Directories v. Henderson contacted the plaintiff in Utah and negotiated with the plaintiff
in Utah, Gorm did not have any contact whatsoever with the Plaintiffs in Utah. Not
only did Gorm not negotiate a contract in Utah, Gorm did not even have a contract with
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the Plaintiffs.

The connection or nexus with the forum state that existed in Phone

Directories v. Henderson is clearly absent in this case.
With respect to Lynge, there is no basis whatsoever to contend that he consented
to specific personal jurisdiction through a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction
clause. Not only did Lynge not have a contract with Plaintiffs with such a clause, he
did not have one with Nu Skin to which Plaintiffs might attempt to bootstrap an
argument for jurisdiction.
There is no basis for asserting specific personal jurisdiction over either Lynge or
Gorm, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
D.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Lynge And Gorm Is Not Established Under Gates
Learjet Corp. v. Jensen.
In their argument that Defendants consented to specific jurisdiction by signing

distributorship agreements with Nuskin, Plaintiffs rely solely on a Ninth Circuit
decision applying Arizona law, presumably as persuasive - not controlling - authority.
See Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984).

That case is

materially distinguishable in numerous respects.
First, unlike in this case, the plaintiff in Gates Learjet was a corporation located
principally in the forum state.

In this case, Plaintiffs, like Defendants, are

nonresidents. The parties' connection with the forum state in Gates Learjet was clearly
greater than in this case.
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Secondly, unlike this case, the plaintiff manufacturer negotiated and entered into
a contract directly with the nonresident defendants.

The defendants even went to

Arizona to negotiate the contract, which provided that it was an Arizona agreement
governed by the laws of Arizona.

Moreover, the parties negotiated additional airplane

purchase agreements between themselves that contained a choice of forum clause
providing that Arizona shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all claims that might
arise under those agreements. In this case, Plaintiffs rely on an adhesion contract to
which they are a stranger. There was no negotiation with Nu Skin over the forum
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Moreover, the plain language of the Nu Skin
agreement, which should be construed in favor of distributors, does not indicate in any
way that the Defendants intended the consent-to-jurisdiction clause to apply to a civil
action involving parties other than Nu Skin.1
Based on the numerous factors connected with the forum state, including the
defendants' purposeful interjection into the forum state and the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute involving one of its residents, the Ninth Circuit held that it was
reasonable to assert jurisdiction over the defendants. In this case, however, no such
1

Nu Skin's Mediation/Arbitration policy, relied upon heavily by Plaintiffs to establish
that the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the main contract similarly
applies to civil actions between distributors themselves, even when Nu Skin is not a
party, is inapposite. This case is a lawsuit filed in district court, and not an arbitration
action. While Plaintiffs have amended to assert a demand for arbitration, they have
chosen not to move to compel arbitration, seeking instead to have the courts hear the
controversy. Indeed, Plaintiffs through counsel expressly acknowledged that they are not
asserting a claim for arbitration at this time.
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factors exist.

To require these Colorado residents to litigate a civil action in Utah

brought by residents of Texas, who could have brought the action in Utah,2 is
unreasonable and would offend traditional notions of fairness and due process.
CONCLUSION
Appellees Lars Lynge and Gorm International Corporation respectfully request
that the Court affirm the trial court's ruling that they are not subject to personal
jurisdiction in this action brought by residents of Texas.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

,

ffi*^i£^^

^Ton V. Harper
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants
Lars Lynge and Gorm International Corp.

2

Plaintiffs contend that this matter should be litigated in Utah to further the interests of
Nu Skin. Nu Skin has nothing to do with this case. Once the matter is decided, if Nu
Skin needs to realign distributors to reflect a judicial decision, that step can be taken,
regardless of where the litigation is conducted. The remainder of Nu Skin's concerns and
considerations set forth in Plaintiffs' Brief pertain to its Mediation/Arbitration policy,
which Plaintiffs have elected not to pursue at this time by electing not to move to compel
arbitration.
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ADDENDUM

Document

Date

Order

01/23/01

Defendant Lars Lynge's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

05/12/00

Affidavit of Defendant Lars Lynge

05/15/00

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lars Lynge's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

06/08/00

Defendant Gorm International's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction

05/18/00

Affidavit of Guy Humphries in Support of Motion to Dismiss 05/18/00
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Letter to Judge Harding from Edward McBride

06/19/00
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

Jon V. Harper, #1378
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

) ORDER

;
,

NUSKTN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON,
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL
CORP.,
Defendants.

)) Civil No. 000400807
)
) Division jtff ^
)
)
)

On Wednesday, November 29, 2000, the Court presided over a hearing on the
respective motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Lars Lynge,
Defendant Gorm International, and Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton
Associates, Inc. Plaintiffs were represented by Edward T. McBride, Esq.; Defendants Lars
Lynge and Gorm International were represented by Jon V. Harper, Esq.; and Defendants
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Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., were represented by Richard W.
Mitchell, Esq.
After considering the moving and opposing papers and the arguments of counsel, and
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants5 motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted, for the reasons set forth in Defendants' respective
supporting memoranda and during oral argument.
DATED:
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Gary D. Stott
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Edward W? MofijKde, Esq.
DONALD J.^tJRSER & ASSOC, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/Jon V. Harper, Esq. f
(^ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Attorneys for Defendants Lars Lynge and Gorm
International Corp.

// £M/
Marl: E. HincMey, EstfT
STOEL RIVES LLP ^ - ^
Attorneys for Defendants David Clifton, Dennis
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc.
2
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Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., were represented by Richard W.
Mitchell, Esq.
After considering the moving and opposing papers and the arguments of counsel, and
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted, for the reasons set forth in Defendants' respective
supporting memoranda and during oral argument.
DATED:
BY THE COURT:

The HonorabirQaty D. Stott §• >''.Vr;;-«;:>^v; \
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge* .•; :> ',5-NTJ \ \-t
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Edward W. McBride, Esq.
DONALD J. PURSER & ASSOC, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/

/
JanV. Harper, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Attorneys for Defendants Lars Lynge and Gorm
International Corp.

M*rk E. Himley, Esc(r
STOEL RIVES LLP
Attorneys for Defendants David Clifton, Dennis
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc.
2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that
on the 26th day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
[Proposed] Order to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:

Donald J. Purser
Edward W. McBride
Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C.
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Plaintiffs James Wagner
and Jim Wagner, Inc.
Mark E. Hindley
Stoel Rives LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
- and Richard W. Mitchell
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Jon V. Harper, #1378
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
;)

DEFENDANT LARS LYNGE'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

V.

NU SKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
]
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLD7TON, ;) Civil No. 000400807
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS
;
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ;I Division #6
CORP.,
]
Defendants.

)

Defendant Lars Lynge ("Lynge"), by and through counsel of record, hereby submits
the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is a completely baseless action brought by a disgruntled multi-level marketing
distributor (Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. ("Wagner")) and its principal participant (Plaintiff
James Wagner). Plaintiff James Wagner is a resident of Texas. Wagner itself is a Texas
corporation that does not do business in Utah and is not registered to do business in Utah.
The action is baseless for a variety of reasons. First, Wagner asserts that it has a
contract with Defendant Nu Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). This contract underlies all
of the claims asserted in the action. The contract is quite clear, however, that any disputes
arising out of the contractual relationship between Nu Skin and Wagner is subject to a
mandatory mediation/ arbitration procedure spelled out in the distributor contract. By filing
this action, Plaintiffs have blatantly disregarded the very contract under which they are suing.
Second, Plaintiffs assert various breach of contract claims not only against Nu Skin,
under Wagner's contract with Nu Skin, but also against two other corporate distributors Defendant Clifton Associates, Inc. ("Clifton") and Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm"),
as well as against the individuals who participate in those corporate distributorships. These
claims are baseless because none of these Defendants has an express or implied contract with
the Plaintiffs. Moreover, without a contract, there is certainly no covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to breach, although Plaintiffs assert such a claim against these Defendants.

2

Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims are baseless because the facts simply will not support
Plaintiffs' legal assertions. In that regard, Plaintiffs complain of Gorm and Lynge moving out
from under the Wagner distributorship to a new sponsor by acquiring the Clifton
distributorship. There is no basis for complaint, however. Factually, on or about December
1, 1996, Gorm terminated its distributorship relationship, and Lynge terminated his role as an
active participant in the Gorm distributorship. More than a year later, on or about January 9,
1998, Gorm purchased another distributorship1 - the Clifton distributorship.

At that time,

Lynge once again became an active participant in the Gorm distributorship.

Lynge's

participation in the new distributorship was perfectly appropriate under Nu Skin's policies and
procedures:

"A person listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of a Corporation . . .

[Lynge] must wait at least six months after the . . . Corporation has terminated its
Distributorship before becoming . . . an active participant with a Distributor under a different
Sponsor." [§ 3(D) of Nu Skin's Policies and Procedures (emphasis added).] That is exactly
what Lynge did. It had been over 13 months since Lynge had been a "person listed on the
Partnership/Corporation Form of a Corporation" when he became an active participant in the
Gorm distributorship that acquired the Clifton distributorship.

1

Under the Nu Skin policies and procedures, "a Distributor may dispose of, transfer, or otherwise assign
his/her Distributorship assets in any manner allowed by applicable law (including sale, gift, or bequest) with the
prior written consent of the Company, which may not unreasonably be withheld." [§ 3(G) of Nu Skin's Policies
and Procedures.]

3
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Although Plaintiffs' lawsuit eventually will be shown to be baseless and without merit,
there is no sufficient basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Lynge. Lynge
is a resident of Colorado. Plaintiffs are residents of Texas. None of the activities of Lynge
complained of by Plaintiffs took place in Utah, or were directed at any residents of Utah, and
Plaintiffs' claims, therefore, did not arise out of any Utah-related activities. Moreover, what
limited contacts Lynge has had with Utah were not sufficiently continuous and systematic such
that Lynge could be found to be transacting business in the state of Utah. Indeed, any of his
activities relating to Nu Skin were conducted in his capacity as a principal of the Gorm
corporation, and activities of an officer or employee of a corporation do not subject the
individual to personal jurisdiction solely based on those activities.
The Complaint against Lynge, therefore, must be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Plaintiff James Wagner is an individual residing in the state of Texas (f 1 of

Complaint).
2.

Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. ("Wagner"), is a Texas corporation (t 2 of

Complaint). Wagner is not registered to do business in the state of Utah (Affidavit of Lars
Lynge at f 2, attached hereto as Exhibit "A")2.

2

At the time of filing, Mr. Lynge is traveling. The original signature page will be filed and served upon
execution.

4
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3.

As Plaintiffs allege, at all times relevant to the Complaint, Lynge was and is an

individual residing in Colorado (f 5 of Complaint; Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 3).
4.

Lynge does not transact any business within the state of Utah, nor do Plaintiffs

allege in the Complaint that he transacts any business within the state of Utah (Affidavit of
Lars Lynge at if 4; see Complaint).
5.

Lynge has not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by

breach of warranty, nor do Plaintiffs allege that he has caused any such injury in this state
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 5; see Complaint).
6.

From March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, Lynge was a "Principal

Partner" in, and was listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the Gorm distributorship.
As of December 1, 1996, Lynge voluntarily terminated his role in the Gorm distributorship,
when it became apparent to Lynge that Nu Skin was not going to commence operations in his
native country of Denmark in the foreseeable future. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 6.)
7.

On January 7, 1998, Gorm purchased the Nu Skin downline of Defendant

Clifton Associates, Inc. ("Clifton"). On January 9, 1998, Lynge again became the "Principal
Partner" in Gorm's new corporate distributorship with Nu Skin. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t

8.

As of June 30, 1998, Lynge removed himself as "Principal Partner" of the

Gorm distributorship and terminated his formal individual role in that corporate distributorship
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 8).

5
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9.

Lynge's only contacts with the state of Utah have been in his capacity as an

officer or employee of Gorm, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship.

Those

contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in Utah (in
1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries in
Europe.

Lynge has not had a place of business in Utah, has not recruited prospective

distributors residing in Utah, has not been licensed to do business in Utah, has not placed
advertisements in Utah, has not sent direct mailings into Utah, has not maintained a website
accessible to residents of Utah, has not sold product into Utah, has not generated any business
volume from Utah, and has not conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings
in Utah. He has never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah.
He was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his activities
relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and office in Colorado
and in Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at If 9.)
10.

Any contacts Lynge has had with Defendant Dennis Clifton ("Dennis Clifton"),

also a resident of Colorado, took place outside of the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at
19.)
11.

All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege Lynge has engaged took

place outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that
alleged conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside. (Affidavit of
Lars Lynge at H 10.)

6
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12.

Lynge does not have, nor has he ever had, any contractual relationship with

either Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 11.)
13.

Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against

Lynge for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged
by Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the
state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 13.)
ARGUMENT
A.

General Principles of Utah Law Governing the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
over Non-Resident Defendants.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants by a Utah court must

comply with the Utah long-arm statute as well as constitutional due process requirements.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998) provides as follows:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
7
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relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of the
act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the
defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter
45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing
responsibility for child support.
None of Plaintiffs' claims arise out of or relate to any of the enumerated bases under the
statute.
Utah law recognizes two types of personal jurisdiction over non-residents: specific and
general.

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a non-resident defendant has

purposefully directed his activities at residents in Utah and the litigation results from claims
that arise out of, or relate to, those activities. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998); see also
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985); Haas v. A.M. King Industries, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (D. Utah 1998). A Utah
court may exercise general jurisdiction where the non-resident defendant's contacts with Utah
rise to the level of being "continuous and systematic."

See Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).
To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, Lynge must have had "certain
minimum contacts with [Utah] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).

8

1

In this case, Lynge has not purposefully directed any activities at any residents of the
forum state, and, even if there were such activities, the claims asserted in this litigation do not
arise out of or relate to any such activities. Additionally, Lynge's contacts with Utah do not
rise anywhere near the level of being continuous and systematic, and have been so minimal that
the exercise of jurisdiction over him by Utah courts would offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Moreover, such contacts were in his capacity as a principal of the
Gorm corporation, which contacts do not subject him to personal jurisdiction. See Segil v.
Gloria Marshall Management Co., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 915, 918 (D. Utah 1983) (citing
Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1969)). The exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Lynge, therefore, would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and
constitutional due process requirements.
B.

Lynge's contacts with Utah are inadequate to establish specific jurisdiction because
the claims in this lawsuit did not arise out of and were not related to Lynge's Utahrelated activities.
None of the conduct complained of by Plaintiffs in this action took place in Utah or was

directed at any resident of Utah.

That alleged conduct essentially consists of the Clifton

Defendants, Gorm and Lynge working to move the downline of the Gorm distributorship from
under the sponsorship of Plaintiffs to the sponsorship of the downline of Clifton.

More

specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Lynge resigned from the Gorm distributorship but remained

9
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active as a Nu Skin distributor without waiting at least six months before becoming an active
participant in a new distributorship under a different sponsor.3
Plaintiffs contend that the alleged conduct described above was directed at them - that
Lynge was trying to steal the Gorm downline from Plaintiffs and improperly move that
downline under a new sponsor (see Complaint at t 53). Plaintiff James Wagner was a resident
of Texas, and Wagner was a Texas corporation, not doing business or authorized to do
business in Utah. Thus, the conduct out of which the claims in this lawsuit arose was not
directed at any resident of the forum state — Utah.

Moreover, the alleged conduct itself

consisted of action taken by Lynge entirely outside of Utah, the adverse effects of which (if
there were any such effects) were felt in Texas, not in Utah.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims did not arise out of Lynge's Utah-related activities.
"[S]pecific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum state." Arguello v.
Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). Where the claims did
not arise out of, or were not related to, Lynge's Utah-related activities, the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over Lynge by the Utah courts is not appropriate. See id-; Utah Code Ann. § 7827-24(1998).

3

As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Lynge did not violate Nu Skin's policies and procedures
regarding a six-month period of inactivity. As a person listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form for Gorm,
Lynge waited more than 13 months before he became an active participant in the new Gorm distributorship that
acquired the Clifton distributorship - the conduct that Plaintiffs claim caused them damage.

10
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C.

Lynge's contacts with Utah are inadequate to establish general jurisdiction because
Lvnge's contacts with Utah do not rise to the level of "continuous and systematic".
Lynge's general business contacts with Utah are not sufficient to support a finding of

general jurisdiction. Those contacts have not been systematic and continuous. Moreover, his
business contacts have been in the context of his role as a principal of a corporation, which
conduct on behalf of a corporation does not subject a non-resident individual to the jurisdiction
of the foreign state. See Segil v. Gloria Marshall Management Co., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 915,
918 (D. Utah 1983) (citing Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1969)).
Indeed, Lynge's contacts with Utah - attending a couple of company-wide conventions
and taking a short tour of Nu Skin's headquarters - are far less systematic and continuous then
those of the defendant corporation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). In that case, the United States
Supreme Court found that Texas did not have general jurisdiction over a Colombian
corporation. The Colombian company had sent its chief executive officer to Texas for one
contract negotiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, purchased helicopters,
equipment and training services from a Texas company, and sent personnel to Texas for
training. Noting that the defendant corporation did not have a place of business in Texas and
was not licensed to do business there, the court found that the defendant's contacts with Texas
could not be described or regarded as "continuous and systematic" in nature. Id. at 416-17.
Additionally, Lynge's contacts are far less than those of other defendants over whom
courts have declined to exercise general jurisdiction.

ii

See, e.g., Harnischfeger Eng'rs v.
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Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995) (defendant's sales in Utah
amounted to one-tenth of one percent of the defendant's total business nationwide). Lynge has
not sold any product in Utah. There is simply no basis to find that the exercise of general
jurisdiction is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Lynge's contacts with the state of Utah are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
either specific or general jurisdiction. Accordingly, Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction should be granted.
DATED: May 12, 2000.

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

JonV.
Shayne tf. Kohler
Attorney for Defendant Lars Lynge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that
on the 12th day of May, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANT LARS LYNGE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION to be served, via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, upon:

Donald J. Purser
Edward W. McBride
Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C.
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Plaintiffs James Wagner
and Jim Wagner, Inc.

Mark E. Hindley
Stoel Rives LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants Dennis Clifton,
David Clifton and Clifton Associates,
Inc.

Martin R. Denney
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Defendant Nu Skin
International Corp.

Guy B. Humphries
Attorney at Law
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800
Denver, Colorado 80290
Attorney for Gorm International
Corporation
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Jon V. Harper, #1378
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,

) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
) LARS LYNGE
;

v.
NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
]
DENNIS CLD7TON, DAVJJD CLD7TON, ]
CLD7TON ASSOC, INC., LARS
]) Civil No. 000400807
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ;
CORP.,
}I Division #6
Defendants.

)

STATE OF COLORADO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON )

LARS LYNGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
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1.

I am a named Defendant in the above-captioned matter.

I have personal

knowledge of all facts contained in this Affidavit and, if called to testify, would do so
consistently herewith.
2.

Based on my inquiry with the Division of Corporations for the State of Utah,

Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. is not registered to do business in the state of Utah.
3.

I am an individual residing in the state of Colorado.

4.

I do not transact any business within the state of Utah.

5.

I have not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by

breach of warranty.
6.

Between March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, I was a "Principal Partner"

in and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the corporate distributorship that
Defendant Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm International") had with Defendant Nu
Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). As of December 1, 1996, I voluntarily terminated my
role in the Gorm International distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not
going to commence operations in my native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future.
7.

On January 7, 1998, Gorm International purchased the Nu Skin downline of

Clifton Associates, Inc.
Partnership/Corporation

On January 9, 1998, I once again was listed on the
Form

accompanying

Gorm

International's

new

corporate

distributorship application with Nu Skin.

2
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8.

As of June 30, 1998, I removed myself from the Gorm International

distributorship and terminated my formal individual role in that corporate distributorship.
9.

My only contacts with the state of Utah have been in my capacity as an officer

or employee of Gorm International, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship.
Those contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in
Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries
in Europe.

I have not had a place of business in Utah, have not recruited prospective

distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed
advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a website
accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any
business volume from Utah, and I have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or
sales meetings in Utah. I have never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the
state of Utah. I was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in my resident state of Colorado, and
my activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from my home and office
in Colorado and in Europe.
10.

All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege I have engaged took place

outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that alleged
conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside.

3
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11.

I do not have, and have never had, any contractual relationship with either

Plaintiff.
12.

Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against me

for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged by
Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the
state of Utah.
DATED: O S - 1 ^

, 2000.

LARS LYNGE

lAr—
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a notary public, on the / 6 day of May,
2000, by Lars Lynge.

\9\ Z /-£
My Commission Expires:
"•'«...,..••»»"
My
wy

Commission Expires
5-25-00
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JOB V. Harper, #1378
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

)
;)
)
;)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT LARS LYNGE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

,

NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON,
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL
CORP.,
Defendants.

]
]) Civil No. 000400807
;
]) Division #6
:
)

Defendant Lars Lynge ("Lynge"), by and through counsel, hereby submits the
following reply memorandum in support of Defendant Lars Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for

r?z

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.1
INTRODUCTION
Lynge has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In his motion,
Lynge contends that the activity complained of by Plaintiffs against him did not arise out of
any Utah-related activities, and that Lynge's limited contacts with the state of Utah were not
sufficiently continuous and systematic such that Lynge could be found to be transacting
business in the state of Utah.
With respect to Lynge's motion, Plaintiffs apparently do not dispute Lynge's contention
that the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Lynge, i.e., that Lynge has not
purposefully directed his activities at residents in Utah and that this litigation does not result
from claims that arise out of or relate to Lynge's activities in Utah.

See Memorandum in

Opposition at p. 5. Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Court has general jurisdiction over
Lynge based on defendant Gorm International's alleged consent to jurisdiction, and Lynge's
status as Principal Partner of Gorm International. As discussed in greater detail herein below,
any consent of Gorm International was not binding on Lynge, and certainly is not binding on
Lynge when Lynge is not a Principal Partner of that distributorship.
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Lynge submitted a false and misleading affidavit
designed to deceive the Court and seek sanctions against him under Rule 11. First, Lynge did
not state in his affidavit that he did not consent to jurisdiction in Utah.

That assertion is

1

Inasmuch as Plaintiffs improperly combined their memorandum in opposition to Lynge's motion to dismiss with
their memorandum in support of their motion for sanctions under Rule 11, this reply memorandum should also be
deemed to serve as Lynge's memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. See Section B of this
memorandum, infra.

2
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abselutelv false. Secondly, Plaintiffs have blatantly violated the 21-day safe harbor provision
of Rule 11 and the requirement that a motion under Rule 11 must be made separately from
other motions. Plaintiffs, in an obvious underhanded attempt to prejudice and improperly
influence the Court in connection with the motion to dismiss, combined their memorandum in
opposition to the motion to dismiss with a memorandum in support of their Rule 11 motion.
Not only should the Court strike the Rule 11 motion and the portion of the Memorandum in
Opposition dealing with the Rule 11 motion, but the Court should also award Lynge his
attorney fees incurred in opposing the improperly filed and baseless motion.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A.

Any Consent to Jurisdiction on the Part of Gorm International Is Not Binding
upon Lynge.
Plaintiffs assert that Gorm International, through its distributorship agreement with Nu

Skin, has consented to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts for resolution of this litigation.2
While Lynge and his counsel do not speak in this litigation for Gorm International, it is
certainly appropriate for Lynge to comment on this allegation since Plaintiffs base their

2

Plaintiffs do not submit any admissible evidence to support this assertion. Plaintiffs have submitted the Affidavit
of James Wagner in support of their Memorandum in Opposition. The statements in that affidavit dealing with
Gorm International and Lynge, however, are not based on admissible personal knowledge, but on inadmissible
opinions, legal conclusions and hearsay testimony. The Court should strike such testimony. For example, Mr.
Wagner states, '7/ is my understanding that Gorm International Corp. is and/or was an independent distributor of
Nu Skin products and, as such, has voluntarily subjected itself to jurisdiction in the State of Utah." See paragraph 5
of Affidavit of James Wagner. Mr. Wagner does not have any personal knowledge to support that assertion.
Additionally, he states, "It is my understanding that both David Clifton and Lars Lynge were principal partners of
Nu Skin distributors Clifton Associates and Gorm International " Again, he does not have personal knowledge of
that assertion. He even admits that it is merely his "understanding." He goes on to assert the following inadmissible
legal conclusion: "the defendants hcn>e clearly subjected themselves to the laws of the State of Utah. " All of those
statements should be stricken.

3
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assertion that the Court may assert general jurisdiction over Lynge on their allegation that
Gorm International has agreed to submit to jurisdiction in Utah.
Any distributorship agreement between Gorm International and Nu Skin is simply
between those two parties. If Gorm International has agreed in that agreement to submit to the
jurisdiction of Utah courts, that agreement is simply between those two parties. The most that
can be drawn from that agreement, therefore, is that Gorm International has agreed to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts in litigation between Nu Skin and Gorm International. It
does not follow that Gorm International has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts
in any litigation between itself and any other party, such as the Plaintiffs - particularly when
Nu Skin is not even participating in this litigation.3 There is no allegation in this case that
Gorm International has a contract with the Plaintiffs in which Gorm International has agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts in litigation between them.
Even if Gorm International has an agreement with Nu Skin to submit to the jurisdiction
of Utah courts that somehow extends to litigation between the Plaintiffs and Gorm
International, Lynge does not have any such agreement, nor do Plaintiffs assert that there is
any such agreement. Lynge himself has not agreed with anyone to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Utah courts.

3

Plaintiffs state in their Memorandum in Opposition that they have stipulated with Nu Skin to arbitrate their claims
rather than participate in this litigation. See Memorandum in Opposition at p. 2.

4
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Moreover, there is no legal basis, and none has been cited by Plaintiffs, to bind Lynge
to an agreement between the corporate entity Gorm and Nu Skin. Indeed, by way of analogy,
corporate officers are not bound by a contract made in the name of a corporation, and no
personal liability is incurred. See generally 18B Am Jur 2d Corporations, §§ 1840 and 1841
(1985).
Plaintiffs apparently contend that Lynge is subject to Gorm International's alleged
agreement with Nu Skin to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts in disputes arising under
Gorm International's distributorship agreement with Nu Skin on the basis of his status as
"Principal Partner" of that distributorship.

Plaintiffs cite Segil v. Gloria Marshall

Management Co., 568 F. Supp. 915 (D. Utah 1983) in support of that position. There are at
least two reasons why Plaintiffs' contention in this regard is wrong.
First, Lynge was only listed as the Principal Partner during two discrete time frames from March 20, 1996 to December 1, 1996, and from January 9, 1998 to June 30, 1998. (See
Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f f 7 and 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). Lynge has not been
the Principal Partner in the Gorm International distributorship for nearly two years.

(Id.)

Even assuming that Lynge was bound as the Principal Partner by Gorm International's alleged
agreement to submit to jurisdiction in Utah (which Lynge disputes), he was no longer the
Principal Partner of that distributorship when this action was commenced and therefore is no
longer bound to any such agreement.

Moreover, the conduct of Lynge complained of by

Plaintiffs in the Complaint herein took place during 1997, at a time when Lynge was not a

5
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Principal Partner in the Gorm International distributorship. See, e.g.. Complaint at ff 51, 5560, 67 and 70.
Secondly, Segil v. Gloria Marshall Management Co., supra, does not stand for the
proposition that a nonresident individual who was once a Principal Partner in a corporate
distributorship is bound, and continues to be bound even after he is no longer a Principal
Partner, by the corporation's agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign state. In
Segil, two corporations clearly were doing substantial and continuous business in Utah and
were subject to the general jurisdiction of Utah. Indeed, the corporations supervised and/or
operated seven salons in Utah. The sole shareholder of those corporations, who also was an
officer and a director of the corporations, contended that her activities within Utah were all
conducted on behalf of the corporations and therefore she herself was not subject to the general
jurisdiction of that state under the fiduciary shield doctrine. Under that doctrine, an officer or
employee of a corporation may not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state solely on
the basis of her activities in that state on behalf of the corporation which subject the
corporation to the jurisdiction of the state. The issue in Segil, therefore, was whether the
individual should be protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine under the circumstances of that
case.
In this case, the corporation (Gorm International) does not have substantial and
continuous business contacts with the state of Utah. Indeed, Plaintiffs contend only that the
basis for general jurisdiction is the distributorship agreement that Gorm allegedly signed with
Nu Skin agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. This Court, therefore, is

6
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not presented with the question of whether Lynge's activities on behalf of the corporation
should subject him to the general jurisdiction of Utah courts, but, rather, with the question
whether Lynge personally is bound by Gorm's alleged consent to jurisdiction. As discussed
above, there is no basis for extending such an agreement to Lynge personally, particularly
when he is not currently the Principal Partner of Gorm International and has not been so for
two years.
Other than to try to establish general jurisdiction over Lynge through Gorm's alleged
consent to jurisdiction, Plaintiffs do not dispute Lynge's points and authorities in support of his
motion to dismiss. Since Lynge is not bound by any alleged consent of Gorm International,
Lynge's motion should be granted.
B.

Lynge Has Not Violated Rule 11, and In Requesting Sanctions Against Lvnge,
Plaintiffs Have Blatantly Disregarded the Requirements of Rule 11.
Plaintiffs baselessly contend that Lynge submitted a false affidavit stating that he has

not consented to jurisdiction in Utah, and therefore Lynge should be sanctioned pursuant to a
Rule 11 motion. The contention is completely false, as a review of Mr. Lynge's affidavit will
demonstrate. (A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" for the convenience of
the Court.) On that basis alone, the motion for sanctions should be denied.
The motion for sanctions should also be denied because Lynge's motion to dismiss is
not being presented for an improper purpose, and the legal contentions therein are not
frivolous. As discussed in the preceding section of this memorandum, Lynge personally did
not agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts and vigorously disputes that he is
bound by Gorm International's alleged agreement in that regard. Lynge's legal contention that

7
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he is not subject to the general jurisdiction of the Utah courts is not "plainly foreclosed by
well-established legal principles and authoritative precedent." See 2 Moore ys Federal Practice,
§ 11.11 [7][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). If it were, Plaintiffs surely would have cited such
well-established legal principles and authoritative precedent in their memorandum. Plaintiffs,
however, cited only one case, which does not apply to the facts of this case or to the
proposition espoused by Plaintiffs. If a motion filed in this case thus far has violated Rule 11,
it is Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Lynge.
Finally, even if there were merit to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions against Lynge which there is not - the motion should be denied solely on the basis that Plaintiffs have
blatantly violated the requirements of that rule. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other
motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed
with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion
(or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion....
(Emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiffs have served and filed4 their motion for sanctions
concurrently, without providing Lynge the 21-day "safe harbor" period mandated by the rule.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have combined their memorandum in support of their motion for

4

Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is a printout of the docket for this case that shows the Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions was filed on May 30, 2000. The certificate of service indicates that the motion was mailed on May 26,
2000.

8
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sanctions with their opposition to Lynge's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
which is also prohibited by Rule 11. The motion, therefore, should be denied and, indeed,
should be stricken. See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995)(failure to comply
with "safe harbor" provision precluded imposition of sanctions); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing
Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1328 (2nd Cir. 1995)("no evidence in the record indicating that
YRC served Hadges with the request for sanctions 21 days before presenting it to the court,"
sanctions also improper because request for them was part of motion to dismiss); Omega
Sports, Inc. v. Sunkvong America, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 201, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1995)(request for
sanctions denied because party failed to serve 21 days before filing; request also improper
because included in motion for remand); and Glutzer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 183
F.R.D. 632, 639 (WD. 111. 1999)(request for sanctions did not meet requirements for Rule 11
motion because it was not made separately from any other motion).
Additionally, the Court should award Lynge his attorney fees incurred in connection
with opposing this motion. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("the
court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion").
DATED:

June 8, 2000.

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

/ Jpfi V. Harper
^Attorney for Defendant Lars Lynge
* '-)' -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that
on the 8th day of June, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:

Donald J. Purser
Edward W. McBride
Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C.
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Plaintiffs James Wagner
and Jim Wagner, Inc.

Mark E. Hindley
Stoel Rives LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants Dennis Clifton,
David Clifton and Clifton Associates,
Inc.

Martin R. Denney
Callister, Nebeker & McCuIlough
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Defendant NuSkin
International Corp.

Guy B. Humphries
Attorney at Law
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800
Denver, Colorado 80290
Attorney for Defendant Gorm
International Corporation

MWfmufir-
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Jon V. Harper, #1378
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,

) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
) LARSLYNGE
]

v.
NUSKTN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON,
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL
CORP.,
Defendants.

]
]
]) Civil No. 000400807
)
) Division #6
)

STATE OF COLORADO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON )

LARS LYNGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am a named Defendant in the above-captioned matter.

I have personal

knowledge of all facts contained in this Affidavit and, if called to testify, would do so
consistently herewith.
2.

Based on my inquiry with the Division of Corporations for the State of Utah,

Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. is not registered to do business in the state of Utah.
3.

I am an individual residing in the state of Colorado.

4.

I do not transact any business within the state of Utah.

5.

I have not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by

breach of warranty.
6.

Between March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, I was a "Principal Partner"

in and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the corporate distributorship that
Defendant Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm International") had with Defendant Nu
Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). As of December 1, 1996, I voluntarily terminated my
role in the Gorm International distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not
going to commence operations in my native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future.
7.

On January 7, 1998, Gorm International purchased the Nu Skin downline of

Clifton Associates, Inc.
Partnership/Corporation

On January 9,
Form

accompanying

1998, I once again was listed on the
Gorm

International's

new

corporate

distributorship application with Nu Skin.
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8.

As of June 30, 1998, I removed myself from the Gorm International

distributorship and terminated my formal individual role in that corporate distributorship.
9.

My only contacts with the state of Utah have been in my capacity as an officer

or employee of Gorm International, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship.
Those contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in
Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries
in Europe.

I have not had a place of business in Utah, have not recruited prospective

distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed
advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a website
accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any
business volume from Utah, and I have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or
sales meetings in Utah. I have never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the
state of Utah. I was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in my resident state of Colorado, and
my activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from my home and office
in Colorado and in Europe.
10.

All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege I have engaged took place

outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that alleged
conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside.

3
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11.

I do not have, and have never had, any contractual relationship with either

Plaintiff.
Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs1 allegations against me

12.

for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged by
Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the
state of Utah.
DATED: o ^ - 1^

, 2000.

LARS LYNGE

U N SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me. a notary public, on the / 6 day of May,
2000. by Lars Lynge.

.....••...:>x
/O, '

AVW?/UCH

V^v-.

• Notary Public

My Commission Expires:
"''''•MMIHH1"

MvComm.ss.on Expires
Wy

5-25-0°
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4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES WAGNER vs.

GORM INTERNATIONAL CORP

CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
PAY HARDING, JR.
PARTIES
Plaintiff - JAMES WAGNER
Roanoke, TX 7 6262
Represented by: DONALD J. PURSER
Represented by: EDWARD MCBRIDE
Plaintiff -

JIM WAGNER INC

Represented by: DONALD J. PURSER
Defendant -

NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP

Provo, UT 84601-4483
Defendant - DENNIS CLIFTON
Denver, CO 80209
Defendant - DAVID CLIFTON
Austin, TX 7874 6
Defendant -

CLIFTON ASSOCIATES INC

Defendant - LARS LYNGE
Indian Hills, CO 804 54
Defendant -

GORM INTERNATIONAL CORP

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:

REVENUE DETAIL.- TYPE: COMPLAINT
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

17 0.00
170.00
0.00

10K-MORE
120.00
120.00
0.00
0.00

Printed: 06/02/00 14:34:53
A
L
CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts

Page 1

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
50.00
Amount Due:
50.00
Amount Paid:
0.00
Amount Credit:
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
02-25-00 Case filed by jerir

jerir

02-25-00 Filed: Complaint

jerir

02-25-00 Filed: Demand Civil Jury

jerir

02-29-00 Judge HARDING, JR. assigned.

jerir

02-2 9-00 Fee Account created

Total Due:

120.00

jerir

02-29-00 Fee Account created

Total Due:

50.00

jerir
120.00

jerir

Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE; Code
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL; Mail Payment;
02-29-00 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
50.00

jerir

02-29-00 COMPLAINT

10K-MORE

Payment Received:

03-2 9-00 Filed: Defendant Nu Skin International Corporation's Motion to
Dismiss Complaint and Compel Arbitration and For Attorney's
jeanj
Fees
03-2 9-00 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Nu Skin
International's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Compel
Arbitration and For Attorney's Fees

jeanj
jeanj

04-10-00 Filed return: Summons (out of state)
Party Served: LYNGE, LARS
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: March 20, 2000
04-10-00 Filed return: Summons (out of state)

jeanj

Party Served
Service Type
Service Date
04-10-00 Filed return: Summons

jeanj

CLIFTON, DAVID
Personal
March 21, 2000

Party Served: NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP •
Service Type: NonPersonai
Service Date: March 09, 2000
04-24-00 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Nu
Skin International Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Complaint
and Compel Arbitration and for Attorney's Fees

jeanj

04-28-00 Filed: Motion and Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With
Prejudice

jeanj

04-26-00 Filed: Notice to Submit

jeanj

05-01-00 Filed order: Order on Motion and Stipulation for Voluntary
Dismissal with Prejudice
Judge rhardijr

jeanj

Printed: 06/02/00 14:34:53
A
L
CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts

Page

Signed May 01, 2000
05-12-00 Filed: Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton, and Clifton
Associates, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b) (2)
and 17(a)
jeanj
05-12-00 Filed: Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton, and Clifton
Associates, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 17(a)

jeanj

05-15-00 Filed: Defendant Lars Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction

jeanj

05-15-00 Filed: Defendant Lars Lynge's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

jeanj

05-18-00 Filed: Notice of Filing Affidavit of Lars Lynge

jeanj

05-19-00 Filed: Defendant Gorm International's Motion to Dismiss for
Lack' of Personal Jurisdiction
05-30-00 Filed: Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

jeanj
jeanj

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and in Support of
Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Sanctions

jeanj

05-30-00 Filed: Affidavit of James Wagner

jeanj

Guy Humphries
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800
Denver, CO 80290
Telephone: (303)832-002 9
Facsimile: (3 03)8 32-002 9
RECEIVER FOR GORM

im
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC ,

DEFENDANT GORM INTERNATIONAL'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs,
vs,
NUSKIN I N T E R M A T I O N A L CORP.,
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON,
CLIFTON ASSOC. INC., LARS
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONA
CORP.,

0400807
Division fo

Defendants

Defendant Gorm international Corp. ("Gorm"), a
Corporation, moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah
Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action for lack of
jurisdiction over it. As grounds therefore, Gorm states as

Colorado
Rules of
personal
follows:

1.
Gorm incorporates herein the grounds for dismissal set
forth in the Motions to Dismiss and supporting Memoranda filed by
Defendant Lars Lynge and by Defendants Dennis Clifton, David
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc.
2.
Gorm was a Colorado corporation which, on June 18, 1998,
changed its name to Pronet International, Inc. [Humphries Aff. f4]
3As set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and
documents filed by Defendant Lynge, Lynge was the
Partner" of Gorm. Gorm's only contacts with the Utah
been through its agent Lynge and are as set forth in
Lynge Affidavit. [Humphries Aff. f5]

supporting
"Principal
forum have
f9 of the

13

4.
Gorm's limited contacts with the Utah forum through Lynge
are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over it.
WHEREFORE, for the above stated reasons, and the reasons set
forth in the Motions to Dismiss and supporting Memoranda filed by
Defendant Lars Lynge and by Defendants Dennis Clifton, David
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., which are incorporated
herein, Gorm requests that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED:

May 18, 2000

y^m^—
Giitf'fitimphriefcf)Colo. Reg. #10541
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800
Denver, Colorado 80290
(303) 832-0029
RECEIVER FOR GORM INTERNATIONAL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /jr day of May, 2000 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION has been deposited in the United States mail,
postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Donald J. Purser, Esq.
Edward McBride, Esq.
Donald Joseph Purser & Assoc.
2735 E. Parleys Way, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, UT 84109

Jon V. Harper, Esq.
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Mark Hindley, Esq.
Stoel Rievs LLP
201 S. Main Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

2 -
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II THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER,
INC. ,

AFFIDAVIT OF GUY HUMPHRIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON
CLIFTON ASSOC. INC., LARS
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL
CORP.,

:ase K, .

00400807

Jivision #6

Defendants
STATE OF COLORADO
) ss,
COUNTY OF DENVER
Guy Humphries, being first du] y sworn, states as follows:
1.
I am a Receiver appointed pursuant to an Order entered by
the Jefferson County District Court on December 14, 1999 in the
case captioned "Dennis Clifton and Clifton Associates Inc. v. Ann
Friis, Lars Lynge, individually and doing business as Gorm
International, LLC, and Pronet International, Inc.", Case No. 9 9 CV
3264. (the "Receivership Order")
2.
The Receivership Order directs me to manage, operate and
protect what is referred to in the Receivership Order as the
Clifton Nu Skin Downline. The Receivership Order further directs me
to oversee the defense of any lawsuit against the Clifton Nu Skin
Downline. The Clifton Nu Skin Downline is the same downline that is
referred to as the Clifton Downline in the Complaint filed in this
action.
3.
All statements contained in this Affidavit are based upon
facts made known to me in my capacity as Receiver for the Clifton
Nu Skin Downline.

4.
Gorm International Corp. is a Colorado corporation which
was incorporated on October 21, 1994.
On June 18, 1998, Gorm
International Corp. changed its name to Pronet International, Inc.
5.
Lars Lynge was the "Principal Partner" of Gorm
International Corp. Gorm International Corp.'s only contacts with
the Utah forum have been through its agent, Lars Lynge. Those
contacts are as set forth in 59 of the Lynge Affidavit filed in
support of his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
in this case.
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Subscribed and sworn to by Guy Humphries before
Y/ 2000, in the City and County of Denver,
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Attorneys and Counselors at Law
Direct Line (801) 994-0920

June 19, 2000

^
HONORABLE RAYMOND M. HARDING, JR.
Fourth District Court Judge
125 North 100 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Re:

Wagner et al., v, Gorm International,
C'tvi! No. 000400307

Facsimile; (801) 429-1137
at al.

Dear Judge Harding:
I am writing this letter to modify a position that I took during yesterday's hearing
regarding the above-referenced matter. As you know, an issue arose regarding the effect of the
mandatory mediation/arbitration clause contained in the Nu Skin Policy and Procedure Handbook.
This matter was addressed by Mr. Martin Denny. Following Mr. Denny's statements to the Court,
and without proper consideration, I asked the Court to consider the validity of the arbitration
clause. Since the issues of jurisdiction and arbitration appear to be related, I thought that as a
practical matter is would expedite the case. Upon further reflection, and for the reasons set forth
below, I hereby withdraw that request.
The Complaint as it stands names three distributors of Nu Skin, Gorm Internatiotlal,
Clifton Associates and Dennis Clifton, and two individuals, Lars Lynge and David Clifton. As
counsel indicated yesterday, neither Lars Lynge nor David Clifton distributed Nu Skin under their
own names. As such, it is our position that the arbitration clause is not binding between plaintiffs
and these individuals since they were not distributors'of Nu Skin. This is particularly true with
respect to the tort claims alleged against them.
With respect to the remaining defendants, who are distributors, I intend to file an
Amended Complaint containing a claim for declaratory relief, as is my right under Rule 15 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Namely, the cause of action will seek a declaration that the Nu
Skin "contract" is valid and binding upon distributors, requiring them to submit to arbitration in
Utah. Defendants' contention that this is an "adhesion" contract will likely be at issue again. As
grounds for alternative relief, the Complaint will allege the same claims against the Nu Skin
Distributor Defendants as the original Complaint. The Amended Complaint will not have any
impact on the personal jurisdiction issues before the Court.
In light of the apparent complexity of these issues, I believe that the parties and the
Court are better suited to address the arbitration issue under a separate, written motion,
accompanied by a Memorandum of Law. I intend to file such motion, assuming that the Court
finds personal jurisdiction over the parties, after I have better framed the issues in an Amended
Complaint.
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As such, at this point I intend to file a supplemental brief
issues discussed yesterday.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,

Edward ^ / M c B r i d e , Jr.
Attorney at Law
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cc:
Jon Harper via fax and US mail
Richard Mitchell via fax and US mail
Mark Hindley via fax and US mail
Martin Denney via fax and US mail

